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Introduction
It is a long-standing topic of interest whether tax incentives effectively increase savings at the individual level, but due to a lack of high quality data on savings the economic literature has struggled to provide decisive answers (Bernheim 2002) . In a recent paper, Chetty et al. (2014) use high quality annual data on savings for the Danish population to show that tax subsidies to pension contributions are ineffective at increasing savings on private pension accounts. A small minority of people shift their savings to other accounts when the tax incentives are changed, while the large majority do not respond at all. However, tax incentives may not always be ineffective. A hitherto neglected tax incentive for saving in tax deferred accounts arises in connection with the announcement of income tax reforms that change the value of future tax deductions by altering the marginal tax rate (MTR). In this paper, we use a recent tax reform in Denmark as a natural experiment and identify behavioral responses to anticipated changes in tax incentives by exploiting a new data source with information of pensions contributions at the monthly frequency.
The 2010 Danish Tax Reform, Data, and Method
The Danish tax system consists of proportional taxes (a regional tax, a church tax, a labor market tax, and a bottom bracket income tax) and a progressive schedule on top of that. In 2009 the proportional taxes amounted to 43.5% and the progressive schedule consisted of a middle bracket tax rate of 6% and a top bracket tax rate of 15%. The middle and top tax brackets applied to income above DKK 377.000 (one USD corresponds to around DKK 6.5) . A tax reform, passed by parliament on May 28, 2009 and taking effect from January 1, 2010, removed the middle bracket tax and increased the top-tax threshold to DKK 424.000. The tax reform thus lowered the MTR from almost 63% to 56% for people paying top taxes while leaving the marginal tax rate practically unchanged for others.
1 Because contributions to pension savings accounts are deductible the reform gave an incentive to advance pension contributions to 2009 while the tax rate was high.
The Danish pension system consists of three components that are typical of retire- Figure 1 , panel A displays the average monthly contribution rate-measured in proportion to total monthly gross payments to the individual-to employer organized pension accounts. The contribution rate for the C-group is more or less constant at a level of 4.5% throughout the observation period. For the T-group the level is slightly higher.
Results
More importantly, there is a spike in the contribution rate towards the end of 2009. This is consistent with the tax incentive to increase payments while the deduction rate is still at a high level. but it does not reveal whether this increase is counteracted by reduced savings in other accounts. We address this issue in Table 1 , which is based on annual data from the income-tax register on savings in privately organized retirement savings accounts and in financial assets in each of the years 2006-2011. To quantify the effect of the increased contributions to employer organized accounts on savings in privately organised pension savings accounts, we estimate the following equation
where P
P riv it
are contributions to privately organised pension savings accounts in year t measured as a fraction of total annual gross payments, D t is a vector of year dummies,
P

Empl it
are contributions to employer organised accounts measured as a fraction of total 3 Results are very similar if we use other thresholds than 25 percentage points or use a dummy indicator that equals one if an individual has extraordinarily high contribution rates in any of the months after the reform was decided. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 present the results from the estimation. Column (1) is based on the full sample. The results show that when contributions to employer organised accounts increase by one unit then contributions to privately organised accounts increase by 0.156 units. The positive coefficient means that contributions to employer accounts crowd in contributions to private accounts. Crowding in is expected since the tax incentive also applies to private accounts. In column (2) we limit the treatment group to include only the 4,818 individuals who made extraordinary contributions to their employer organised accounts. The parameter estimate from this regression based on the T-group2 and the C-group is smaller, showing that the group contributing extraordinarily to employer organised accounts is only partially overlapping with the group that contributes extra to privately organised accounts.
Finally, we estimate the effect of the total increase in contributions to tax favoured pension savings accounts, i.e. both employer organised and privately organised accounts, on savings in financial assets by running the following regression
where S it is savings in financial assets relative to total gross payments. The income Notes: 95% confidence intervals reported in square brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 0.1% level. These are based on standard errors which are clustered at the individual level. Column (1) and (2) present estimates of β 2 from equation (1) and columns (3) and (4) present estimates of α 2 from equation (2). P Empl and P T otP en are instrumented with
. Estimates in column (1) and (2) are based on the full sample. Estimates in columns (2) and (4) include only those individuals in the treatment group who made extraordinary contributions to employer organised retirement accounts before the reform, here defined as having a pension contribution rate measured in proportion to total gross payments in December 2009 that is 25 percentage points higher than its level in December 2008. All regressions include year dummies and control for individual fixed effects.
tax register records financial wealth at the end of the year and savings in financial wealth is then approximated by the difference between financial wealth in year t and year t − 1. D t is a vector of year dummies and P
T otP en it
are total contributions to tax subsidized retirement savings accounts measured as a fraction of total annual gross payments, which is instrumented using the interaction D 2009 ×D
T reat i
. Column (3) shows estimates for the full sample and column (4) shows estimates for the sample where the treatment group only consists of the 4,818 individuals who made extraordinary contributions to their employer organised retirement savings account. In both cases the parameter is insignificant. The estimate in column (3) has a wide confidence interval, but the estimate in column (4) is more precisely estimated and the confidence interval rules out crowd-out in excess of 22 percent of the increase in contributions to pension savings accounts. This indicates that a large part of the contributions to pension savings accounts shown in Figure 1 passes through to total savings.
Conclusion
This is the first paper to document that an income tax reform generates increased savings through accounts where contributions are tax deductible. The results show that individuals increase deductible contributions to employer organised pension savings accounts when knowing that the future value of deductions will decrease. We find that this increase in pension contributions passes through to total savings, and that the effect is driven by a small fraction of the people affected by the reform.
